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The question of how cooperation evolves between individuals
has been studied for years, most notably starting from the
seminal work of Axelrod [1]. Existing works on evolution
of cooperation typically focused on social dilemmas using
normal form games (see [5] for an overview). For example,
Figure 1 presents the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game
where two players are both faced with a decision to either
cooperate (C) or defect (D). If the game is played once, than
defecting will provide a higher payoff regardless of what the
other player does. However, if the game is played repeat-
edly, unknown amount of times, cooperative behavior might
emerge to increase accumulated payoffs.
We utilize evolutionary game theory to study the evolu-
tion of cooperative societies and the behaviors of individual
agents (i.e., players) in it. We present a novel player model
based upon empirical evidence from the well-founded So-
cial Value Orientation (SVO) theory [3, 2], stating that: (1)
an individual’s behavior may often be motivated not only
by self-interest but also by the consequences for the others,
and (2) individuals vary in their interpersonal social tenden-
cies, which reflect stable personal orientations that influence
their choices.
Our formalism captures the notion of social orientations ex-
hibited in human behavior and provides an abstract formal
representation for how a player develops its strategies in a
repeated game. We present theoretical results showing how
players with different social tendencies interact in a class of
2x2 symmetric games. This analysis identifies five general
steady state behavioral patterns that can be explained in
terms of the players’ varying social orientation values.
We present experiments using evolutionary-game simulations,
demonstrating the effects of social orientations on evolution
of cooperative behavior in individual players and the emer-
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Figure 2: Generalized form of 2x2 symmetric games.
gence of a cooperative society. In one set of experiments,
pro-social tendency increases with increasing reward (i.e.,
R) in the game or with decreasing temptation (i.e., T ).
Previous works on cooperative societies typically used the
average payoff of the society as a measure of of its cooper-
ativeness [8, 9, 4]: i.e., the higher the average payoff is, the
more cooperative the society is thought to be. However, our
experiments also showed that there are scenarios in which
the conclusions of the previous works does not hold: one set
of experiments showed that the society is not a cooperative
one, whereas the average payoff of the society is still high.
2. OUR MODEL
We consider normal-form games for studying social interac-
tions between people or between societies. Figure 2 shows a
generalized form of the payoff matrix for such games, where
various constraints on the outcomes can be used to define dif-
ferent classes of social dilemmas. In this paper, we only focus
on symmetric games where T > S. This means that when
a player defects, he/she is expected to get a larger share of
the total payoff. Note that this assumption is not restrictive:
many well-known games satisfy this condition, including the
well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Stag-
Hunt [10].
Most studies on Social Value Orientation (SVO) based hu-
man behavior typically identifies two opposing social-value
orientations: pro-self and pro-social. A person with the for-
mer gives higher consideration to his/her own payoff, while
a pro-social person gives higher regards to the payoff of the
agents he/she is interacting with. The social orientation is
not an absolute value: it is a range in which at one ex-
treme we have complete pro-self behavior, and at the other
extreme complete pro-social behavior. Humans differ from
one another by being placed at different locations on that
range. In contrast to this diversity, the traditional rational-
ity assumption in game theory dictates that all individuals
are completely pro-selfish, without any difference between
one another.
Figure 3: An Illustration of the social value orienta-
tion space.
Based on these results from behavioral sciences, we start by
defining the social-orientation space of the two players in a
game, namely Player i and Player j. The social-orientation
space of a game can be viewed as a two-dimensional Eu-
clidean space, as illustrated in Figure 3 [7]. The x-axis repre-
sents the accumulated total payoff of Player i and the y-axis
represents that of Player j.
The social orientation of Player i is a unit vector ŝi such
that ŝi’s initial point is at the origin of the social-orientation
space. We represent ŝi by the angle, θi between ŝi and the
x-axis of the social-orientation space. Intuitively, the social
orientation of a player is a model of its tendency to adopt a
pro-social or pro-self behavior in the game.
For example, when θi = 0 then Player i acts as a pure indi-
vidualistic. If θi = π/4, then this means that player is fair,
i.e., it acts to balance the accumulated total payoffs of two
players. When θi = π/2, the player is purely pro-social, i.e.,
it never attempts to maximize its own payoff, but rather it
tries to increase the payoff of the other player.
During the course of the game, each player aims to bring the
direction of game model closer to its social-orientation vec-
tor, ŝi. In other words, each player aims to change the world
to conform to its preference and social-orientation. The dif-
ferences between the orientations of the players creates the
tensions in their social interactions – hence the social dilem-
mas. Note that with the traditional rationality assumption,
the agents will try to do utility-maximization on its own
payoff. In other words, the theta equals to zero and social
orientation equals to 〈1, 0〉.
3. ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTS
This section summarizes our theoretical analysis and exper-
imental evaluation on how players with different social ten-
dencies interact; for the details of our analysis and experi-
ments, see [6]. Our analysis identify five general steady-state
behavioral patterns, that can be explained in terms of the
players social orientation values. We have also performed
an experimental evaluation of our model using evolution-
ary simulations in the well-known PD game. The results
of the experiments demonstrated that our model captures
the known behavior patterns in PD. Furthermore, it allows
modeling richer behavior patterns since it does not depend
on the particular game matrix.
When we varied the payoffs in the game matrix while keep-
ing the preference relations intact in the PD game, one set
of experiments showed that pro-social tendency increases
when the reward (i.e., R) of the game increases or when the
temptation (i.e., T ) decreases. Another set of experiments
identified a class of scenarios in which the evolution simu-
lations produced a population that is not socially-oriented
toward cooperation, whereas the average payoff of the popu-
lation is still high. This result is contrary to the conclusions
of all previous works that considered cooperative popula-
tions: in the previous works, the high-payoff was assumed
to be an indicator for cooperativeness, whereas our experi-
ment showed that social orientations in a population could
be a more realistic representations of the cooperativeness of
the entire population.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have described a formal model that combines game-
theoretical analyses for cooperation in repeated 2x2 sym-
metric games (where S < T ) with insights from social and
behavioral sciences. Our model is not claimed to be the
most accurate account of social orientations, rather, it is a
simple model that takes the first step in the above direction.
Unlike existing models, this formalism captures the notion
of pro-social vs. pro-self orientations exhibited in human
behavior and explicitly provides an abstract representation
for how a player develops its strategies in repeated games.
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